We develop a model of occupational choice and entrepreneurship in which market frictions limit the possibilities for diversifying entrepreneurial risk. A concern for relative standing arises in this model even though individuals care only about the consumption of standard commodities. In contrast to the complete markets outcome, an increase in aggregate risk increases entrepreneurship due to relative wealth concerns. A change in the profile of the economy to include more risk-averse people results in an even greater increase in entrepreneurship. Thus, relative wealth concerns mitigate the reduction in entrepreneurship arising from the non-diversifiability of entrepreneurial risk. We examine the effects of uncertainty about economic policies such as market-based reforms on entrepreneurship.
Introduction
The notion that people are motivated by a desire for rank and social status has a long history in economics (e.g. Smith, 1759, pp. 50-58) . Despite this, the idea has remained peripheral to the main concerns of economists. The reason is not its lack of descriptive accuracy, but rather the widespread belief that allowing utility functions to be affected by such things as a desire for social status would result in models that have no predictive power (Cole et al. 1995, p. 12) . This view has not gone unchallenged, and there are notable recent attempts to incorporate a concern for relative standing into economic models. Relative wealth concerns have been modeled as a feature of preference, whereby utility functions are an increasing function of the rank in the income distribution (e.g. Robson 1992 ), or of a "status good" (as in Becker et al. 2005) . Relative wealth concerns can also arise in settings where agents consume only standard commodities (Cole et al. 1992 and 2001 , DeMarzo et al. 2004 ). This happens, for instance, when access to some good depends on rank in the income distribution. In this paper, we develop a model of relative wealth concerns of this latter variety, and use it to analyze occupational choice and entrepreneurship. The key decision facing an agent is whether to take up wage employment or to become an entrepreneur.
1 Choices are shown, at the margin, to be driven by a desire for higher relative wealth. In the context of a general equilibrium model, we trace out several consequences of such preferences.
One of the more interesting margins on which status preference has been shown to make a difference is the propensity to bear risk-a conclusion of the literature being that the desire for rank leads to an increased preference for risk. A similar effect arises in our framework where relative wealth concerns are shown to lead to an increase in entrepreneurship and risk-taking. In our model, entrepreneurial risk is not diversifiable and, as a consequence, there is less entrepreneurship than would be the case with complete markets. Relative wealth concerns are shown to mitigate this difficulty. Relative wealth effects are shown to be especially plausible when there is uncertainty about economic policy, such as the implementation of market-based reforms. The model allows us to deduce the effect of policy uncertainty on entrepreneurship-all other things being constant, policy uncertainty induces greater entrepreneurship. From the perspective of 1 Although our main focus is entrepreneurship, many of our ideas can be applied to the choice between any two occupations that differ in the risk profile of earnings. In this setting, the choice of the riskier employment is also an entrepreneurial activity. Thus, relative wealth concerns will also arise when occupational choice is between employment with differing risks. In fact, a special case of our model can be reinterpreted as such. Entrepreneurship is the most natural example of choice between occupations driven by differences in the risk profile of earnings. the economy, a consequence of increased entrepreneurship is that there are larger fluctuations in aggregate wealth, and these lead to greater price volatility. Under certain conditions, price risk and income volatility become so high that the relatively less riskaverse agents abandon entrepreneurship. Instead, they manage price risk by choosing employment, whereas relatively risk-averse become entrepreneurs and face output risk.
Our model of entrepreneurship is in the tradition of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) , but with significant differences.
2 First the similarities. Since our focus is on entrepreneurship, and the essence of entrepreneurship is bearing risk (Knight 1921) , there are impediments to the efficient allocation of risk. The exact nature of the impediments is not central to the purposes of this paper. Like Kihlstrom and Laffont, we assume that institutional constraints prevent the efficient allocation of risk. In a more elaborate model, these constraints could be motivated as arising from incentive or enforcement constraints. A significant difference between our model and Kihlstrom and Laffont is that, in our model, there is price uncertainty. The cause of this uncertainty is the presence of sector-specific aggregate shocks, which create correlation in the likelihood with which entrepreneurial bets pay off. If all bets pay off together the wealth of the economy increases which has a non-negligible effect on prices. This introduces a new source of uncertainty which was not considered by Kihlstrom and Laffont and others.
Our model contains goods that become relatively scarce, and hence more expensive, when aggregate wealth increases. Consequently, only people with high positions in the wealth distribution have access to them. A good example is housing in exclusive neighborhoods, such as Park Avenue in New York, Mayfair in London, Malabar Hill in Mumbai. 3 Indeed, almost every city in the world has such exclusive neighborhoods.
Other examples of such goods include luxury goods such as fancy cars, high fashion, art, 2 Kihlstrom and Laffont formalized Knight's (1921) idea that entrepreneurs are those who bear risk in society. Parker (1996) considered dynamic occupational choice. Rampini (2004) provides a "business cycle frequency version of Knight's theory of entrepreneurship." Fraser and Greene (2006) explore the effects of optimism bias. Other key formulations also view entrepreneurship as a problem of occupational choice (Kanbur 1979 , Lucas 1978 , Banerjee and Newman 1993 , Holmes and Schmitz 1990 . Parker (2004) provides an in-depth overview of the literature.
3 A dramatic manifestation of the phenomenon is in the spike in the signing of real-estate deals in New York City in anticipation of Wall Street bonuses, as consumers try to pre-empt price increases. (Wall St. Bonuses: So Much Money, Too Few Ferraris, New York Times, December 25, 2006.) exclusive clubs, restaurants, private schools, yachts, . . . . We assume that price effects of aggregate wealth fluctuations cannot be hedged by taking portfolio positions (see DeMarzo et al. 2004) . What people can do to hedge price variations is make appropriate occupational choices. In equilibrium, individuals are seen to make choices that correlate their wealth with the aggregate wealth of society. They seek out professions that will leave them with greater wealth in precisely those states in which desired but scarce goods are more expensive. In this way, relative wealth concerns arise endogenously: individuals bear more risk as doing so preserves their rank in the wealth distribution.
Our model has two goods and one factor of production, labor. There is a continuum of agents differing in their risk profile. Occupational choice is endogenous, with people deciding between employment and entrepreneurship. All entrepreneurial activity is in one sector. 4 There is also sector-specific aggregate risk, as a result of which the output of entrepreneurial sector varies across states. Entrepreneurs not only consume the goods of their own sector, but also consume goods, such as real estate, that are produced in the other, "traditional", sector. The goods produced in traditional sector become relatively scarce when aggregate wealth goes up due to higher output in the entrepreneurial sector.
The traditional good's price then varies positively with aggregate wealth.
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We start by considering a model with only idiosyncratic risk and reproduce a key result of Kihlstrom and Laffont-there is a cutoff in the degree of risk aversion such that everyone who is more risk-averse than the cutoff becomes a worker, while all others become entrepreneurs. We then introduce aggregate risk. When entrepreneurial outcomes are correlated we have the price uncertainty alluded to above. We show that the cutoff changes, with an increase in the amount of entrepreneurship. This increase arises from the attempts of marginal workers to correlate their wealth with the aggregate wealth of the economy to hedge price uncertainty. 6 As a consequence of the fact that 4 For instance, this may be the manufacturing sector. Alternatively, it may be the sector experiencing a sector-specific technological change (e.g. the IT sector in India). Or if trade reforms have been undertaken, the opportunities may arise in the import/export sector.
5 Although the logic of our model does not require this other good to be a luxury good of the type mentioned above, keeping the real estate example in mind helps with the intuition. 6 A conscious desire to hedge prices when choosing profession is not necessary. Many plausible equilibrating mechanisms could lead to such an outcome. For instance, young people may be guided entrepreneurial returns are not diversifiable, there is less entry into entrepreneurship than would be the case with complete asset markets. We compute the complete markets equilibrium and assess the welfare loss associated with the incompleteness of markets.
The excess entry resulting from relative wealth considerations is seen to mitigate the problem of too little entrepreneurship associated with non-diversifiability. The effect is not however of a magnitude that can restore efficiency.
Policy shocks are an important source of aggregate risk. This is especially true for economies undergoing economic reforms, where the success of entrepreneurial ventures depends upon the continuation of reforms to which there is often considerable political opposition.
7 Such uncertainty can have adverse effects, with a reduction in entrepreneurship as a possibility. 8 It is also typically the case that the effects of reform are distributed unevenly across sectors. Entrepreneurial sectors such as manufacturing or services are more likely to be affected directly, whereas housing in posh neighborhoods tends to be only indirectly affected. So price uncertainty of the kind mentioned above is a possibility, as are relative wealth effects. We study the effects of policy uncertainty on entrepreneurship. All other things being equal, policy uncertainty induces greater entrepreneurship, once again, mitigating forces that suppress entrepreneurship.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and present the definition of equilibrium appropriate for our economy. In section 3 we present our key results. We examine occupational choice in presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk,
show how relative wealth concerns arise, and examine the effects of allowing agents to diversify entrepreneurial risk. In section 4, we study how policy uncertainty associated with economic reforms affects entrepreneurship. In section 5, we identify conditions under which high income volatility and price risk causes relatively less risk-averse agents in their choice of occupations by observing the success of others in obtaining exclusive real estate. 7 The risk of reforms being turned back is significant: the pace and direction of reforms undergo frequent changes due to exogenous policy shocks. Policy uncertainty is relevant even in the absence of reforms. For example, a new venture must meet many regulatory requirements that change over time.
8 Rodrik (1991) models policy uncertainty as the likelihood of policy reversal. His main point is that, to the extent that this uncertainty can be resolved by waiting, entrepreneurs will withhold investments, which is a serious barrier to the success of reforms. For real barriers to productive entrepreneurship at the grass-roots level in the context of economic development, see Dutz et al. (2000) .
to abandon entrepreneurship and, instead, manage price risk by choosing employment.
2 Model
We consider a two-date model with two goods (labeled 0 and 1), one factor of production (labor), and a continuum of agents differing in their coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor. Agents begin, at date t 1 , by making a choice between becoming a worker or an entrepreneur. If the latter, the labor endowment can be changed into the entrepreneurial input at no cost.
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All entrepreneurial activity takes place in one sector-producing good 0.
11 Having all entrepreneurship in one sector is not critical for our results. What is critical is that entrepreneurs in this sector are subject to common shocks that create fluctuations in the aggregate output of good 0. Good 1 is produced in the traditional sector (e.g. luxury real estate). We will refer to the former as the 'entrepreneurial' good, and the latter as the 'traditional' good. Good 0 is the numéraire.
The output from entrepreneurial projects is uncertain and its realization is revealed only at date t 2 > t 1 when production and consumption take place. At date t 2 , there are also spot markets for labor and consumption goods. There are no long-term labor contracts or forward markets for the delivery of the two goods. As with other papers in the literature, we assume that entrepreneurs cannot diversify the risk from operating the risky technology. Incentive and enforcement constraints are often advanced as reasons why entrepreneurial risks might be uninsurable/non-diversifiable. Individual effort could affect the success of new ventures, and such effort might be unobservable.
The likelihood of success may be private information, leading to market failure. And 9 The details of solving the model have been provided in Appendix A of Atolia and Prasad (2008) . 10 It is typical, in entrepreneurship, that agents invest private resources to acquire physical capital. While capital is absent from our model, our results do not make essential use of this. For relative wealth concerns, what matters is the distribution of consumption. We obtain variation across states by requiring an irreversible investment of labor endowment which is then combined with hired labor to produce random output. A commitment of capital could also be required to generate random output. If the risk of losing such capital is modeled then, to the extent that the salvage value of invested capital is less than the amount initially committed by the entrepreneur, there would be even greater variation in consumption and relative wealth effects would persist, if not get stronger. 
Technology
Production occurs at date t 2 . Entrepreneurs operate the risky technology that uses k units of labor for every unit of entrepreneurial input (e) to produce the entrepreneurial 12 It is worth observing that market frictions may also respond to the change in the nature of risk. At least in the case of incentive problems, when entrepreneurs face common shocks the prospects for efficient risk-sharing will improve. Performance of others provides information, and this can be used to provide incentives (for instance, via relative compensation schemes). Market incompleteness arising from enforcement problems (due to weak enforcement of contract law) will persist with aggregate risk.
good. 13 Employing l 0 workers a project's output is
where A 0 > 0 is the random productivity parameter. The output depends on the state of natures that is realized at date t 2 . Thus, for an entrepreneur with coefficient of risk aversion γ, the random profit from operating the risky technology is
where ys 0 (γ) is the random output of the entrepreneurial good for entrepreneur-agent γ in states ∈S and w s is the competitive wage in state s ∈ S.
14 The traditional good uses only labor and is produced using a standard risk-less technology. There is only one firm producing the good and its output is given by
where A 1 > 0 is the productivity, and β is the elasticity of output with respect to labor.
Profit maximization by the firm gives the labor demand and output as
where p s 1 is the relative price of good 1 in state s. As there are decreasing returns to scale in production (except when β = 1) there are profits which are
13 This is not a critical assumption. Indeed, for reasonable parameterizations our results become stronger -with larger relative wealth effects -when a flexible technology is used.
14 Although the distribution function for output is same for all entrepreneurs, we need to allow for the output realizations to differ across entrepreneurs for a particulars ∈S to capture different degrees of correlation across project returns. Therefore, project specific variables are indexed by γ.
Preferences
There is a continuum of individuals of measure 1 who are heterogenous in their risk preferences. In particular, the distribution of γ in the population is
which is exogenous and public knowledge. For an agent with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ, consumption bundles are ordered by
where c (γ) is the CES aggregator of consumption
In equation (8), c 0 (γ) is the consumption of good 0 and c 1 (γ) is the consumption of good 1. The parameter α, which determines the relative preference for two goods, is the same across all agents. The traditional good becomes more important in consumption as α increases. It is easy to show that the exact consumption based price index is
where, p 1 is the price of the traditional good. Given income I (γ) of agent γ, the real consumption and the indirect utility function are
Shepard's lemma, then, gives demands of individual goods as
The ex-ante direct and indirect utility functions take the following expected utility form:
where I (s,s) (γ) is the income of the agent in state (s,s) ∈ S ×S. The aggregate state space is at most countable and the individual state space is at most a continuum.
Occupational Choice and Utility Maximization
Recall that at date t 1 each agent decides whether to be an entrepreneur or accept wage employment. The agent who chooses wage employment has income w s . Those choosing entrepreneurship operate the risky technology to produce the entrepreneurial good.
While operating the risky technology, the entrepreneur has to use his labor endowment to manage the firm. His income is the profit from operating the risky technology.
Workers are hired in the spot market, and there are no long term labor contracts.
In addition to the income from his occupation, the agent also receives a profit income
1 from his endowment ofθ 1 (γ) shares of the firm producing the traditional good. Thus, the total income of an entrepreneur and a worker are
With an agent's optimal consumption choice already subsumed in (15), the agent makes his occupational choice so as to maximize (15) subject to (16) and (17).
Equilibrium
The equilibrium in this economy is a partition (Γ, Ξ) of [γ * , γ * ] and a set of functions
such that, given the endowment of shares of the firm producing the traditional good,θ 1 (γ), and the exogenous distribution of risk aversion g (γ) , γ ∈ [γ * , γ * ], the following four conditions hold:
(a) if γ e is an agent with γ e ∈ Γ, then given that all other agents with γ ∈ Γ choose to be entrepreneurs and all agents with γ ∈ Ξ become wage earners, agent γ e 's best response is to choose entrepreneurship. The corresponding consumption demand for the two goods is (c
(b) if γ w is an agent with γ w ∈ Ξ then, given that all other agents with γ ∈ Ξ choose to be wage earners and all agents with γ ∈ Γ become entrepreneurs, agent γ w 's best response is to choose wage employment. The corresponding consumption demand for the two goods is (c
2. Given {p
1 maximizes profits of the firm producing the traditional good.
3. Given {p
, the markets of both goods clear in every state, i.e., ZS πs
where
4. Given partition (Γ, Ξ) and {l s 1 } s∈S , the labor market clears in every state, i.e., Z
The procedure for solving for the equilibrium is standard and details may be found in Appendix A of Atolia and Prasad (2008) . However, certain properties of equilibrium are worth noting. Since l s 1 is the only term that depends on s in (21), employment and output in the traditional sector are state independent. In addition, (4) shows that the marginal product of labor and, hence, the real wage in terms of this good (w s /p s 1 ) are also state independent. Thus, wage varies directly with the price of the traditional good. The price will depend on state because the demand depends on aggregate income, which in turn depends on the random aggregate output of the entrepreneurial good.
We show (numerically) that there exists a
Further, the following marginal indifference condition holds for the marginal agent, γ c , who is assumed to be an entrepreneur:
where subscripts e and w represent variables for agents choosing to become entrepreneurs and workers respectively. Although it may seem counterintuitive at first, it is possible that in general equilibrium, for some parameter values, fluctuations in wages are greater than those in entrepreneurial profits. In that case, agents with low risk aversion will choose to become workers. This possibility is discussed in section 5, but for now we concentrate on the case where Γ = [γ * , γ c ] so that the less risk averse become entrepreneurs.
Aggregate Risk and Relative Wealth Concerns
Our model yields several results relating to entrepreneurial choice. In this section, we
show how relative wealth concerns arise in the presence of aggregate risk. Entrepreneurship provides a better hedge against price variation-it yields more wealth precisely when the price of the traditional good is high. 15 This leads individuals to bear more risk and thus to greater entrepreneurial activity. 16 Consequently, when others in the economy choose to be entrepreneurs, volatility of aggregate wealth is increased which, at the margin, attracts new entrepreneurs.
To illustrate results, we consider the following baseline set up. The individual project output has two states, low (l) and high (h), with output of 1 and 2 units. The risk aversion of agents and the endowment of the shares of the traditional firm are both
The total number of shares of the traditional firm is normalized to 1. In particular,
A similar argument appears in DeMarzo et al. (2004) , who show community effects or relative concerns can arise endogenously in portfolio choice. In another related model, Cole et al. (2001) , analyze the decision to allocate initial endowment between two random investments. Although relative wealth concerns arise for different reasons, agents again invest less in projects whose returns are idiosyncratic and more in projects whose returns are correlated with the returns of other agents. Our focus here is on occupational choice, where a similar effect arises. This leads to a model that is different in many key respects. In particular, in addition to the differences relating the margin of choice (viz. occupations), our model also has heterogeneity in risk preferences. 16 Our model relies on the incompleteness of markets to generate relative wealth concerns. This result is in sharp contrast to the result with complete markets (see section 3.4), where entrepreneurial activity is decreased when risks become correlated.
where {π l ,π h } is the marginal distribution of the individual states. Further parametrization of the model is as follows: k = 1; A 1 = 1/β; α = .5; β = .5; κ = 1.5; γ * = .5; γ * = 2.5.
Thus, each entrepreneur employs one agent while providing managerial input. With α = .5, the agent likes both goods equally. The elasticity of substitution between the two goods (κ) is greater than 1 so that fluctuations in the price of the traditional good (and hence fluctuations in labor income) due to variation in aggregate wealth are less than the fluctuations in entrepreneurial income. In this case, the less risk averse agents choose to become entrepreneurs. The case with κ < 1 is treated separately in section 5.
To examine how aggregate risk creates relative wealth concerns, and how this affects entrepreneurial choice, we compare two scenarios. The lottery in terms of project output at the individual level is left unchanged, but the risk changes from idiosyncratic to aggregate. The aggregate uncertainty, so created, causes price uncertainty, which in turn creates a concern for relative wealth. The comparison shows that individuals make occupational choices that correlate their wealth with the aggregate wealth in society.
Idiosyncratic Risk and Occupational Choice
We first consider occupational choice when the project risk is completely idiosyncratic.
With no aggregate uncertainty, there is no uncertainty about the wage (w), the price of the traditional good (p 1 ), and the income of workers. However, entrepreneurial income is uncertain. In particular, the income of the marginal agent from employment and entrepreneurship is given by
and the marginal indifference condition (22) simplifies tõ
To compute the equilibrium, we numerically solve for γ c , l 1 , w, and p 1 which yields 
Aggregate Risk and Occupational Choice
To assess the implications of aggregate uncertainty for occupational choice, we now look at the alternative scenario with only aggregate uncertainty. This happens when returns on projects are perfectly correlated. We will denote the correlation between the output of any pair of entrepreneurs by ρ. The case with only aggregate risk has ρ = 1, and ρ = 0 is the idiosyncratic case.
When risk is aggregate, the aggregate output has two states, low (L) and high (H),
5 and π H =π h = .5. The prices and wages now depend on the aggregate state and the income of both entrepreneurs and workers is uncertain. Therefore, the income of the marginal agent from the two alternatives is
The marginal indifference condition (22) becomes
To compute the equilibrium, we numerically solve for Among the differences, note that γ c is higher than for the idiosyncratic case. Real wages and relative prices vary across states. In particular, p 1 is higher in state H. We now discuss the differences in detail, and explain how relative wealth concerns have arisen.
Relative Wealth Concerns and Entrepreneurship
The first thing to note is that the marginal entrepreneur is now more risk-averse. Thus, aggregate wealth uncertainty, due to increased correlation of risk across agents, encourages entrepreneurial activity, with 28.70% of agents now choosing to become entrepreneurs. The result that an increase in aggregate uncertainty raises entrepreneurial activity will be seen to stand in sharp contrast to the complete markets case. Given the riskiness of the production of the entrepreneurial good, the attractiveness of producing this good declines when κ rises, as it can now be easily substituted in consumption. Consumers are no longer willing to pay high price for it. Similarly, γ c also declines with an increase in β-with a higher β decreasing returns set in slowly in the traditional goods sector which increases the opportunity cost of producing the entrepreneurial good. Finally, Table 1 shows that change in the value of k, the number of workers required in an entrepreneurial project, has no qualitatively significant effects.
In the aggregate risk case, where more people choose to become entrepreneurs, the wage of workers goes up and the expected earnings of entrepreneurs goes down.
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In spite of this, such a shift to entrepreneurship is rational since, in contrast to the idiosyncratic case, there is now volatility in prices, and entrepreneurship provides a hedge against this. While marginal agents are optimally responding to price signals, it appears as if they are attempting to better correlate their income realization with aggregate wealth. In other words, they appear to be concerned about their relative standing in the wealth distribution.
Comparison to Complete Markets
The result that an increase in aggregate uncertainty raises entrepreneurial activity stands in sharp contrast to the complete markets case where, as we now show, entrepreneurial activity falls. We begin by describing the mechanisms used to accomplish complete markets for the two cases. One can also independently solve the social planner's problem (see Appendix B in Atolia and Prasad, 2008) . The solution to the planner's problem allows us to confirm that complete markets outcomes are Pareto efficient.
Idiosyncratic Risk and Market Structure for Complete Markets
In the complete markets case, entrepreneurs are allowed to sell shares of their project to others. This allows them to diversify risk by constructing portfolios that include shares of others' projects. With expected utility preferences, identical probabilities, and idiosyncratic risk, we will have full insurance in equilibrium. The resulting allocation does not depend on γ. A simple mechanism reproduces the complete markets outcome. We group shares of the entrepreneurial projects into a mutual fund. All entrepreneurs get equal shares in this mutual fund. Since the prices of shares of entrepreneurs' projects will be identical in equilibrium, all entrepreneurs are able to exchange the single share in their own projects for equal shares in everyone's project. Being risk-averse, they will want to. With this arrangement, all idiosyncratic risk is insured and neither entrepreneurs nor workers have an incentive to trade any other assets even if they were given the option to do so.
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With this market structure, the income of the entrepreneurs becomes
Workers' income continues to be given by (23). The marginal indifference condition now simplifies to
This is quite intuitive since, with complete risk sharing, the marginal agent's income must be the same in each occupation for him to be indifferent. 20 More formally, now
which immediately leads to (32). The details of solving for the equilibrium values of γ c , l 1 , w, and p 1 can be found in the Appendix A of Atolia and Prasad (2008) . 19 In this case, workers do not participate in the asset markets for risk sharing. Note that there are other ways of distributing assets in this economy, but all lead to identical consumption possibilities. 20 Note that all incomes are risk-less and equal so that, in equilibrium, all individuals are indifferent between occupations. What is determinate is the proportion of individuals engaged in each occupation. There is no loss in assuming that the low γ individuals are entrepreneurs.
Aggregate Risk and Market Structure for Complete Markets
In the case with only aggregate uncertainty, returns on entrepreneurial projects are perfectly correlated. Hence, shares of all projects are identical and can be reinterpreted, without loss of generality, as shares of a mutual fund. 21 We then have only two assets available for trade -shares of the mutual fund and shares of the firm producing good 1.
Since we have only two aggregate states, and returns of the two assets are not perfectly correlated, it is enough to allow trade in these assets to implement complete markets.
The timing of events and operation of markets in these assets is as follows. Each agents makes his occupational choice. Those deciding to become entrepreneurs get equal shares in the mutual fund for the entrepreneurial projects. The total number of shares being normalized to 1, we haveθ 0 (γ) = 1/ (γ c − γ * ) , γ ≤ γ c .
Thereafter, asset markets open. Let q 0 and q 1 denote prices of the shares of firms producing good 0 and good 1 respectively. Given his occupational choice, the agent now solves
subject to
and q 0 and q 1 denote the price of shares of the mutual fund and the traditional firm.
After asset markets close, the uncertainty about the project returns is resolved.
The computation of equilibrium is similar to the incomplete markets case. With q 0 set to 1, only one more aggregate variable, q 1 , needs to be solved for. The required 21 It may be noted that aggregation into a mutual fund is merely for ease of account keeping in this case. On the other hand, for idiosyncratic risk, it was substantive as it provided insurance. equation comes from the market clearing condition for either asset. In particular, we
Comparison of Occupational Choice and Efficiency
The numerical computations for the complete markets case show that entrepreneurial activity declines as the nature of risk changes from idiosyncratic to aggregate. Let us consider the case with γ * = 10.5. In this case, γ c falls from 3.410 to 3.326 implying a 2.97% decrease in entrepreneurial activity. This contrasts starkly with our earlier results, when markets were incomplete. In that case, more agents became entrepreneurs so as to correlate their wealth with the aggregate outcome. Entrepreneurial activity increased by 9.65%.
How large is the inefficiency generated by the absence of complete markets? First, let us consider the case with idiosyncratic risk. To quantify the inefficiency, we follow Lucas (1987) and, for each agent, calculate the percentage change required in incomplete markets consumption to obtain same utility as was obtained with complete markets.
The extra absolute consumption requirement, aggregated over all agents, quantifies the difference in the efficiency of the two equilibria in term of Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
The final measure expresses the extra aggregate output as a percentage of the actual aggregate output for the incomplete market case. A positive value indicates that the complete market outcome is more efficient in Kaldor-Hicks sense. According to this measure, the absence of asset markets implies an efficiency loss of 5.37%.
In the case of aggregate risk, we compute the percentage change in consumption for each agent as above. However, the extra absolute consumption requirement is aggregated over all agents separately for each aggregate state. In this case the loss of efficiency is much smaller at, 0.63% when the aggregate state is H and 0.67% when it is L.
It is not surprising that the absence of markets generates inefficiency. The inability to insure against risk in entrepreneurial activity leads to less than optimal risk taking in the economy and inefficiently low supply of the entrepreneurial good. The fact that the loss of efficiency is smaller with aggregate risk is not surprising either. The absence of asset markets is felt more strongly in the idiosyncratic case where there are huge opportunities for risk sharing. When risk is aggregate, most of it is not insurable by trade in assets. The gains from risk sharing are small, arising mainly from heterogeneity in risk aversion and the resulting occupational choices. The gains are also small because, with aggregate risk, relative wealth concerns lead to an increase in entrepreneurship in the direction of the complete markets outcome which is also optimum as we show in Appendix B of Atolia and Prasad (2008) .
Distributional Implications of Market Incompleteness
While the complete markets outcome is comparatively more efficient, not all agents are better off with the move to complete markets. Figure 2 compares the utility profiles of the agents for the incomplete and complete markets case. For both the idiosyncratic and the aggregate risk case, a movement from incomplete to complete markets encourages entrepreneurship due to better risk sharing. The increased production of the entrepreneurial good reduces its relative price, making entrepreneurs worse off and workers better off. Workers also gain from an increase in the marginal product of labor.
As nobody is worse off from risk sharing, workers are unambiguously better off with the movement to complete markets. Matters are different for entrepreneurs and the losses from adverse price movements need to be offset by gains from risk sharing. However, among entrepreneurs, who gains from risk sharing, and by how much, depends on their degree of risk aversion as well as the nature of risk.
In the idiosyncratic case all risk is insurable. However, insurance as a result of the move to complete markets yields little gain to the least risk-averse entrepreneurs.
Being unable to offset the loss from adverse price movement, they are worse off. In the aggregate risk case, even with complete markets, there is residual uninsurable risk. The least risk averse agents are best able to bear it via larger holdings of shares in risky ventures. Thus, while least risk-averse entrepreneurs gain a lot from bearing residual risk and more risk-averse from insuring their risk, those in the middle gain little from either, and hence, fail to offset their loss from adverse price movement.
Economic Reforms and Aggregate Risk
The previous section analyzed the effects of an exogenous change in the nature of risk on occupational choice. In this section, we build upon the intuitively plausible idea that economic policies introduce such an element of common risk for entrepreneurs and show how this can naturally create aggregate risk for entrepreneurs. Although our ideas are quite general we will, for concreteness, focus on the case of economic reforms.
22
Policy uncertainty is often identified as a problem for reforms (e.g. see Rodrik, 1991) .
The success of reforms requires investments by entrepreneurs, but if entrepreneurs are uncertain about the success of reforms they may hold back investments. This in turn may reduce the likelihood of the success of reforms. In this section, we show that relative wealth concerns increase entrepreneurship and so may be a mitigating factor.
We model two aspects of policies associated with economic reforms-uncertainty and effectiveness. There is uncertainty about the probability of implementation (in this regard our model resembles Rodrik, 1991) . A somewhat separate question relates to the scope of reforms. Although a variety of formulations are possible, we take the viewpoint that, if reforms are effective, then a larger proportion of entrepreneurs will be successful. The uncertainty and effectiveness combine to induce correlation between the outcomes of projects of different entrepreneurs. This transforms the nature of the risk profile for the economy into one with higher aggregate volatility and risk. In what follows, we begin by making precise this connection between economic policies and the structure of correlation across projects' returns. 
Economic Reforms, Policies and the Correlation Structure
Suppose that there are two states for aggregate output ("high" and "low"), i.e. S = {H, L} as in the examples of the previous section. Let q denote the probability of the high state of aggregate output i.e.
The probability q captures policy uncertainty-uncertainty about implementation of reforms. If the policy is implemented, the high aggregate state obtains and a large number of entrepreneurs are successful; if not, the low state obtains and many are unsuccessful.
In this setup we can think of the situation before reforms (the "status quo") as a case with no policy uncertainty (q sq = 1) but a low success rate of entrepreneurial projects 23 There is another, technical, reason for developing the model as we do. We have a continuum of agents (indexed by γ ∈ [γ * , γ * ]) and those who choose entrepreneurship face the prospect of high ¡ y (2002)) such invocations of the strong law of large numbers are not generally valid. Our framework deals with this issue and enables us to relate the correlation structure of individual outputs to the actual realizations of the aggregate output.
(φ sq ). Note that while there is no policy uncertainty, each entrepreneur is still uncertain about whether he will be among the successful entrepreneurs or the unsuccessful ones but this risk is entirely idiosyncratic. Reforms change the calculation. We may think of an individual entrepreneur as now facing a two stage lottery. First, the state of aggregate output is determined with high output having probability q. In the second fixed and known to everyone. We will take φ H to be a measure of policy effectiveness.
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Implementation of a new policy may be uncertain, so that q < 1. However, the policy could be much more effective, resulting in disproportionately more projects being successful (i.e. φ H > φ sq ) if reforms are successfully implemented. It may also be the case that φ L > φ sq , but what is important is that the probability of high output
increases. This will clearly make entrepreneurship more attractive by increasing the expected value, Ey 0 , of the project.
But there is also a positive effect on entrepreneurship via relative wealth concerns. This effect arises because a better policy not only increases the expected value of the project but also the correlation of return across projects. This, in turn, induces aggregate risk. Since our focus is on relative wealth concerns, we look at the special baseline case with q = 1/2 (maximal policy uncertainty) and
which the effect of change in the expected value of the project on entrepreneurship is eliminated. 25 On the other hand, the aggregate risk and correlation of return across projects induced by policy still remains and can be increased or decreased by raising or lowering the degree of policy effectiveness, φ. In fact, it is easy to show that the correlation coefficient from which it follows that
so that φ and ρ are positively related. In particular, from (41) it follows that when φ = 1, we have ρ = 1 and φ = 1/2 implies ρ = 0. Hence, in our baseline case, for status quo with ρ = 0, we have φ sq = 1/2. 
Economic Policy and Entrepreneurship
We use the baseline case to demonstrate how implementation of new economic policies (e.g. during economic reforms) endogenously creates relative wealth concerns. With the effect of economic policy on expected value of the project eliminated, the occupational choice in the baseline case solely reflects the relative wealth concerns. Since these concerns arise from increased correlation across individual project returns induced by new economic policy, we present results for different values of ρ (see Table 2 ). Recall, in the baseline case the status quo has ρ = 0. Relative wealth concerns lead to extra entrepreneurial activity, with the effect becoming progressively stronger as ρ and aggregate risk increase. For example, 25.59% of agents are initially entrepreneurs for γ * = 10.5. The entrepreneurial activity rises by 6.30% agents when ρ rises to 0.5. For the extreme case of ρ = 1, the increase is higher at 9.65%. Again, this is in contrast with the complete markets case which would witness a decrease in entrepreneurial activity with a rise in ρ as we saw in the last section.
Is this increase in entrepreneurial activity inferior, e.g. in the Kaldor-Hicks sense?
We quantify the efficiency loss: (1) for each agent, we calculate the percentage change in status-quo consumption required to obtain the same utility as with the new policy (assuming ρ = 1); and (2) we aggregate the extra (absolute) consumption required over all agents and express it as a percent of the actual aggregate output for the status quo.
A negative value would imply that the new policy is inferior in the Kaldor-Hicks sense.
Surprisingly, the increase in entrepreneurial activity due to an increase in policy induced aggregate risk is welfare improving. For the case with γ * = 10.5, the new policy is superior to the status quo and generates an aggregate consumption gain of 0.71%. In contrast, with complete markets the new policy generates a loss of 3.94%.
The effect of the new policy on different agents is also different from the complete markets case. Figure 2 compares the utility profiles of the agents in the status quo and with the new policy in two cases. It also shows the percent consumption equivalent of the utility difference. In our baseline case, the new policy makes the least risk-averse agents worse off whereas more risk averse agents are better off -just the opposite of the outcome with complete markets. With the new policy, in the baseline case with incomplete markets, γ c increases and workers gain from a reduction in the relative price of the entrepreneurial good. Workers also gain from the increase in the marginal product in terms of traditional good. However, with complete markets, these effects operate in the opposite direction as γ c falls. The explanation for the opposite effect on the least risk averse agents is similar.
Policy Effectiveness
The baseline case is deliberately stylized to demonstrate the presence of relative wealth concerns. With more realistic policies, there is a change in both expected returns from the project and the correlation of project returns. For example, consider an economic reform with q not necessarily equal to 1/2 and φ L not necessarily equal to 1 − φ H .
In this case, one can show that as the effectiveness of reforms, φ H , rises above φ L , the aggregate risk and the correlation of individual project returns rise, just as in the baseline case. For the symmetric case (φ between ρ and φ is depicted in Figure 3 . Thus, the increase in entrepreneurial activity due to relative wealth concerns coexists with increased entrepreneurship due to the increase in expected output. To summarize, an increase in policy effectiveness leads to a ceteris paribus increase in entrepreneurship.
Policy Uncertainty
We now consider the effects of changes in policy uncertainty while maintaining the symmetry assumption. Our baseline case with q = 1/2 is the case with maximum uncertainty: the uncertainty decreases as q is increased to its maximum possible value, 1.
For different fixed values of q ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, Figure 3 shows the correlation ρ as function of φ. The topmost curve is for q = 0.5. Then, as q increases (i.e. as policy uncertainty decreases), the function converges pointwise to the horizontal axis (the constant function ρ(φ) = 0). In particular, we see that for a fixed value of φ, the correlation coefficient ρ becomes smaller when q is increased. An increase in q will also change an entrepreneur's expected output which will clearly have an effect on the desirability of the project. But as ρ becomes smaller, aggregate wealth fluctuations are reduced as well, which will alleviate relative wealth concerns. As a result, there is a ceteris paribus decrease in the amount of entrepreneurship when policy uncertainty becomes smaller.
Inelastic Demand and Entrepreneurship
A rise in entrepreneurship also occurs when demand for the traditional good is inelastic. Table 1 , for each β, the first column gives the percentage increase in entrepreneurship when risk becomes aggregate (i.e. ρ rises from 0 to 1). As in the case with κ > 1, the effect becomes stronger as β increases or κ comes closer to 1. However, we will see that there are some important differences as well. In this section, we will deal with the baseline case and assume that q = 1/2 and φ Table 3 : Sensitivity Analysis for Inelastic Demand.
Aggregate Risk, Real Estate Booms, and Occupational Choice
When demand is inelastic, the correlated risks in the entrepreneurial sector generate strong general equilibrium price effects. Recall that in our setup equilibrium supply of the traditional good is the same in the two aggregate states. As a result, the price of the traditional good is highly volatile. An example of such a good would be housing in exclusive neighborhoods. Thus, the model suggest that the real estate sector may experience a big boom in economies implementing major reforms. This has indeed been the experience of many economies that have undergone successful reforms.
The model, however, says more. When demand for the traditional good is highly inelastic, price risk may result in higher volatility in real wage income than in entrepreneurial profits even though the source of risk lies in entrepreneurial activity. Note that the price risk for workers arises from the fact that their wage is fixed in terms of the traditional good across the two aggregate states. If the price risk becomes more important than the output risk, less risk-averse individuals will abandon entrepreneurship to manage price risk by choosing employment.
Recall, aggregate risk rises with ρ which increases price volatility. The preceding discussion then implies that there exists a critical value of ρ, ρ c , such that for ρ > ρ c less risk averse agents become workers. .5, 10.5] . As ρ rises from zero towards ρ c the difference in utility between being a worker or an entrepreneur starts going down. At ρ = ρ c all agents are indifferent between the two choices. As ρ rises over ρ c , the trade off changes sign and less risk averse agents become workers managing the price risk. For example, when κ = .50, this transition occurs at ρ = .26493 (see Table 3 ). 27 Even so, the amount of entrepreneurship is greater with aggregate risk and, in fact, rises monotonically with ρ.
The model implies that if aggregate risk induced by reforms is above a threshold there will be changes in the occupational choice of agents. The key point here is that with higher price volatility, arising out of inelastic demand for traditional goods, wage income may become more volatile and risky. The less risk-averse agents then find greater rewards managing price risks.
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6 Conclusion
The preference for higher positions in the income distribution serves an important social function in our model. It mitigates the adverse effects stemming from the inability to diversify entrepreneurial risk. Thus, we find that a preference for relative wealth leads to a preference for risk-taking, and increases entry into entrepreneurship. The effect arises because entrepreneurship provides a hedge against price uncertainty, and allows access to traditional goods by providing higher incomes in precisely the states in which their price is high. A rule of thumb for obtaining traditional goods -housing in exclusive neighborhoods was our leading example -would be "make decisions that protect your position in the income distribution." Such goods can reasonably be called status goods-not necessarily because their consumption confers status, but because people with higher status (i.e. rank in the income distribution) have better access to 27 It must, therefore, be noted that the cut-off value γ ρ=1 c means that now agents with γ ∈ £ γ ρ=1 c , γ * ¤ become entrepreneurs when ρ = 1. 28 A similar effect arises in Newman (2007) . He shows that, in a moral hazard model, for a range of preference specifications more risk-tolerant people move away from entrepreneurship. Newman is led by this to question Knightian explanations of entrepreneurship based on risk preferences. However, as the moral hazard model has not had much empirical success (Prendergast, 2002) , such a conclusion would appear to be premature. 29 It is easy to generalize this result. Consider a general model where occupational choice involves choosing among becoming a worker, an entrepreneur in the risky entrepreneurial sector, and an entrepreneur in the traditional sector. In that setup, when price risk become sufficiently large, one will see less risk-averse agents moving away from running a project in the entrepreneurial sector to becoming either a worker or to running a project in the traditional sector. So, in that case, 'the real estate boom will be accompanied by the infusion of entrepreneurial talent in that sector.' The reason is that, like the wage of the workers, the profits in the traditional sector are fixed in terms of the traditional good. Thus, both workers and entrepreneurs running projects in traditional sector face the same price risk.
them.
Relative wealth concerns are an important issue for economic reforms and other policy changes. In this paper we focused on the effects of policy uncertainty on entrepreneurship. It is also possible to examine the phenomenon of resistance to reform in the context of our model. Resistance is to be expected, since reforms tend to change status positions in society. We would then expect resistance to the policy from people whose relative wealth is adversely affected. The most ardent supporters are likely to be the people who gain in relative terms. In fact, our results on the distributional implications of reforms give a more detailed answer to the question of who gains and who loses under reforms in the presence of relative wealth concerns -in both the complete and incomplete markets case (e.g. see Figure 1 ). More generally, consider the following scenario. Suppose economic reforms create aggregate wealth fluctuations, and this generates fluctuations in relative prices. People who are better able to hedge the fluctuations are more likely to support reforms, those who aren't will resist reforms. If occupational choices are the only avenue for hedging, then the young (and others who are better able to change professions) are more likely to support reforms. Resistance is more likely to come from those who find it more costly to switch professions. Further, if reforms create aggregate risk, the design of reforms must take into account the fact that agents will care about their relative standing in the wealth distribution. Further work on welfare effects of economic reforms when agents care about relative wealth is certainly warranted.
A standard intuition is that entrepreneurs bear risk and are rewarded for this with higher average returns. In our framework, workers may bear risk as well (in the aggregate risk case, because of price uncertainty). There would still be an entrepreneurship premium if the expected income of entrepreneurs exceeds that of workers. In the case with no aggregate uncertainty workers face no risk, so there is certainly a premium.
It is possible to show that the premium is much smaller when risks are correlated.
We find, in our framework, that relative wealth concerns lead to much greater entry into the entrepreneurial sector, and this drives down the returns from entrepreneurship while increasing the returns from wage employment. 30 All this relates to a well-known empirical puzzle. Recent empirical work suggests entrepreneurs bear considerable income risk, but earn returns no higher than they would from a diversified stock portfolio (Moskowitz and Vissing and Jorgenson 2002, Roussanov 2007) . Financial markets are largely absent from our set-up, so our results, though suggestive, do not have a direct bearing on this puzzle. But it should be possible to introduce trading in a broad range of assets together with occupational choice and to examine this question.
Solving the Model with No Aggregate Uncertainty
As noted in the paper, with no aggregate uncertainty, the wage (w) and relative price of traditional good (p 1 ) are certain. Further, from (A.2) the aggregate income is
where first term is the aggregate endowment of the entrepreneurial good.
Given the aggregate income (A.3) and the income of the marginal agent from employment and entrepreneurship in (23 − 25), to determine the equilibrium we need to solve the following equations .6) and (26) for γ c , l 1 , w, and p 1 .
For the complete market case, the income of the marginal agent from entrepreneurship is given by (31) and (26) is replaced by (32) while solving for the equilibrium values of γ c , l 1 , w, and p 1 .
Solving the Model with Aggregate Uncertainty
Unlike the case with no aggregate uncertainty, the wage and the relative price of traditional good are now dependent on the aggregate state. The aggregate income in each aggregate state is
(A.8)
Given the aggregate income (A.7 − A.8) and the income of the marginal agent from employment and entrepreneurship in (27 − 29), to determine the equilibrium we need to solve (A.4) , (30) and the following equations
Algorithm for Solving the Complete Markets Case
For the complete market case, in addition, we need to solve for q 1 using (38), the market clearing condition for the shares of the mutual fund for the entrepreneurial projects.
The numerical procedure to solve for the equilibrium is iterative and has following steps:
1. Choose guess values of γ c and q 1 .
2. Now use the guess value of γ c to solve for all other aggregate variables. 
Solving the Model with Policy Uncertainty
To solve for the equilibrium when uncertainty is due to policy, we begin by defining a state space for individual states and a conditional probability distribution on it that is consistent with our model of policy uncertainty. In particular, letS = [0, 1] and let the conditional probability distribution be
where J denotes the indicator function which has value 1 when condition in subscript is true. Thus, statess ∈ [0, q] only occur when s = H and other individual states occur when s = L. In addition, for a given aggregate state, all individual states, that can occur, have same probability. For a given s, for everys that can occur, a fraction φ s get high output and others get low output.
Having defined the appropriate state spaces and probability distributions, to compute the aggregate equilibrium note the following fact: the uncertainty about the entrepreneurial projects enters the determination of the aggregate equilibrium only in (22) and ( 
where m (Γ) is the measure of the entrepreneurs. Thus, note that aggregate output for a given s is independent ofs as it should be. In addition, as the random selection of entrepreneurs to produce high output is independent acrosss, φ
is, also, the conditional probability of an entrepreneur of producing high output given s = H (L). 
Idiosyncratic Risk
In this case, the planner's problem simplifies further in a very intuitive manner. With only one aggregate state of the economy and V soc increasing in the real value of the aggregate output, Y (γ c ), the planner's only concern in choosing γ c is to Solving the model for the parametrization in Section 3 with γ * = 10.5 gives the social planner's choice of γ c as 3.410 which is the same as that for the complete markets case. In particular, therefore, the complete markets outcome is Pareto efficient.
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We now investigate the source of inefficiency for the incomplete markets outcome. Figure B .1 shows the production possibilities frontier (PPF) and the equilibrium outcome with complete and incomplete markets along with the corresponding market prices. As is well known, efficiency of market outcomes requires three conditions to hold: (1) The marginal rates of substitution in consumption (MRS) should be equalized 34 An immediate implication of this is that the relative weights that the social planner puts on different agents and the distribution of risk aversion are irrelevant to the of γ c . It may be noted that the assumption of CES-CRRA preferences plays an important role in this result as well. 35 It must, however, be noted that while the choice of γ c for the social planner's problem is independent of the social planner's objective function, the actual allocation across agents will depend on it and will, in general, be different from the competitive market outcome. across all agents; (2) the economy should produce on production possibilities frontier; and (3) marginal rate of transformation (MRT) should equal the MRS.
In either market outcome both conditions (1) and (2) hold. Condition (1) holds as all consumers face the same relative price of goods. Condition (2) holds as there are no factor market distortions. However, condition (3) fails with incomplete markets: the price vector is not tangent to the PPF at the incomplete markets equilibrium.
While the production is efficient, as it occurs on frontier, the economy operates on the wrong point of the PPF due to market imperfections. Specifically, with incomplete markets, the economy overproduces the traditional good as its relative price is lower than the marginal rate of transformation of entrepreneurial good into traditional good.
Understandably, failure to insure idiosyncratic risk leads to less than optimal risk taking in the economy. Complete markets allow for such insurance, and so reproduce the social optimum. 
Aggregate Risk
With aggregate risk, the social planner has to consider utility trade-offs between the two states. The nature of the tradeoffs depend on the exact form of the planner's objective function. However, some progress can be made by looking into how production efficiency constrains the choice of γ c . This can be seen from the first graph in Figure B is shown in the second graph of Figure B .2.
The graph shows that the complete markets outcome is Pareto optimal: the outcome is on the derived PPF and γ c ∈ [3.191, 3 .561] ensuring production efficiency. The figure also shows that the MRT is equal to the MRS (the equalization of the MRS between the two states, across all agents, being a consequence of risk sharing). The incomplete markets outcome also achieves production efficiency. However, it fails to be efficient as the MRS between two states is not equalized across agents. Once again, inefficient risk sharing reduces entrepreneurial activity, lowering the ratio of the real output in high state to that in the low state. With risk sharing, the market outcome produces greater entrepreneurial activity because the resulting volatility in real output is absorbed by less risk averse agent via asset trading. 36 However, in this case, the outcome differs from the social optimum. The reason, as stated before, is that the trade-off across the two states depends on planner's objective function. For current parametrization of the model, overall availability of goods in the economy is high so that it is optimal to allocate a larger fraction of consumption to the less risk averse agents. It is also optimal for the planner to choose a higher variability of real output as these less risk averse agents do not care as much about this volatility. Thus, γ c for the planner's problem is higher than for the complete markets case.
